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On 30 October 1997, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [1] (hereafter the 
Commission) adopted its report in the so-called Tablada case [2]. The case concerned an 
attack launched by 42 armed persons on military barracks of the national armed forces in 
1989 at La Tablada, Argentina. The attack precipitated a battle lasting approximately 30 hours 
and resulting in the deaths of 29 of the attackers and several State agents. The surviving 
attackers filed a complaint with the Commission alleging violations by State agents of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (hereafter the American Convention) and of rules of 
international humanitarian law [3]. In its report the Commission examined in detail whether it 
was competent to apply international humanitarian law directly. It answered this question in 
the affirmative. [4] 
 
This decision is of considerable importance. It means that the Commission, a regional inter-
governmental human rights treaty body, is competent to invoke international humanitarian 
law and that it can apply the rules thereof to States party to the American Convention. This 
decision may pave the way for future petitions accusing, for instance, Colombia, Mexico or 
Guatemala of violations of international humanitarian law. It may encourage other human 
rights treaty bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee, set up pursuant to 
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the European Commission and 
Court of Human Rights, to extend their supervisory functions to international humanitarian law. 
 
Should the Tablada decision set a precedent? The answer depends in part on the strength of 
the arguments for applying international humanitarian law in a given case. The arguments 
presented by the Commission to this effect are examined below, but first let us say a few 
words on why the Commission deemed it important that it should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law at all. 
 
The Commission explained that it should apply humanitarian law because this enhanced its 
ability to respond to situations of armed conflict. It found that the American Convention, 
although formally applicable in times of armed conflict, was not designed to regulate situations 
of war. In particular, the Commission noted that the American Convention did not contain 
rules governing the means and methods of warfare. It gave the following example: 
 
“[B]oth common Article 3 [of the 1949 Geneva Conventions] and Article 4 of the American 
Convention protect the right to life and, thus, prohibit, inter alia, summary executions in all 
circumstances. Claims alleging arbitrary deprivations of the right to life attributable to State 
agents are clearly within the Commission’s jurisdiction. But the Commission’s ability to resolve 
claimed violations of this non-derogable right arising out of an armed conflict may not be 
possible in many cases by reference to Article 4 of the American Convention alone. This is 
because the American Convention contains no rules that either define or distinguish civilians 
from combatants and other military targets, much less, specify when a civilian can be lawfully 
attacked or when civilian casualties are a lawful consequence of military operations.” [5]  
 
The Commission is right. Distinguishing between those who have the right to resort to acts of 
hostility and those who do not, for instance, is an essential feature of international 
humanitarian law, while human rights law has no rules to this effect [6]. Two comments are, 
however, in order. In the first place, we should not overestimate the role of common Article 3 
vis-à-vis human rights law. Common Article 3 does not define who is a civilian. Nor does it 
specify when civilian casualties are a lawful consequence of military operations. Secondly, 
human rights law may also have an impact on the conduct of military operations [7]. The 
European Court on Human Rights, in the case Akdivar and others v. Turkey [8], restricted the 
State in its choice of means to combat the PKK. It appeared that even derogable human rights 
may apply in these situations [9]. Thus, it is questionable whether, as contended by the 
Commission, “it would have to decline to exercise its jurisdiction” if it had not applied 
international humanitarian law. [10] 
 
Since it concluded that it should apply international humanitarian law, the Commission had to 
construe its legal competence. Clearly, it could not find an express legal basis. According to its 
Statute, the material competence attributed to the Commission is limited to the American 
Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man [11]. These 
instruments do not explicitly provide a legal basis for applying international humanitarian law. 
How, then, could a legal basis be found? One option would have been to refer to rules of 
humanitarian law as ‘sources of authoritative guidance’ [12]. However, the Commission 
wanted to go further. It evaluated the conduct of States party to the American Convention 
directly on the basis of international humanitarian law. To support its view the Commission 
presented five arguments. 
 
1. Competence to apply international humanitarian law could be derived from the overlap 
between the substantive norms of the American Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The Commission stated: 
“Indeed, the provisions of common Article 3 are essentially pure human rights law. Thus, as a 
practical matter, application of common Article 3 by a State party to the American Convention 
involved in internal hostilities imposes no additional burdens on [a State], or disadvantages its 
armed forces vis-à-vis dissident groups. This is because Article 3 basically requires the State 
to do, in large measure, what it is already legally obliged to do under the American 
Convention.” [13]  
 
It is doubtful whether this argument, while in itself true, provides a legal basis for the 
Commission to apply humanitarian law. In the first place, the fact that the substantive norms 
of the American Convention cover a part of common Article 3 does not mean that these 
instruments are interchangeable. If that were indeed the case, why do we have two separate 
legal systems? Indeed, as the Commission noted, human rights law and humanitarian law 
specify their own fields of application [14]. Secondly, one should distinguish between the 
substance of norms and the supervisory means attached to them. The fact that the 
substantive norms of human rights law and international humanitarian law are complementary 
in character does not mean that supervisory bodies set up under human rights law are ipso 
facto competent to apply humanitarian law. If States had wished to set up an international 
mechanism similar to that of the Inter-American Commission to supervise compliance with 
international humanitarian law, they would have established it directly in the Geneva 
Conventions. [15] 
 
2. Article 29b of the American Convention could provide a legal basis to apply international 
humanitarian law. This Article states that no rule of the American Convention shall be 
interpreted as “[r]estricting the enforcement or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by 
virtue of ... another convention to which one of the said States is a party”. The Commission 
argued that: 
 
“[W]here there are differences between legal standards governing the same or comparable 
rights in the American Convention and a humanitarian law instrument, the Commission is duty 
bound to give legal effort [sic] to the provisions of that treaty with the higher standards 
applicable to the rights or freedoms in question. If that higher standard is a rule of 
humanitarian law, the Commission should apply it.” [16]  
 
This is a remarkable argument. Article 29b of the American Convention can be invoked against 
a State which claims that the Convention allows it to limit the protection prescribed by 
international humanitarian law. To resolve such a claim, the Commission may be required to 
consider whether the State concerned has indeed limited the application guaranteed by 
humanitarian law. However, it needs to do so for the sole purpose and only to the extent 
necessary to decide whether there has been a violation of Article 29b of the American 
Convention. This article does not require or authorize the Commission to examine the State’s 
compliance with humanitarian law as such 
 
3. The Commission argued that competence can be derived from Article 25 of the American 
Convention, which entitles everyone to an effective remedy before a national court “for 
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or 
laws of the State concerned”. The Commission found that this article obliges States to provide 
judicial protection against violations of norms set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in so 
far as they have incorporated these norms in domestic law. However, supposing the 
Commission’s findings to be correct and even if States had incorporated the norms of 
humanitarian law in their domestic legislation, the Commission’s competence would be limited 
to allegations of violations of the right to an effective remedy. This article does not empower 
the Commission to assess compliance with humanitarian law, or to examine whether States 
have correctly transformed humanitarian law obligations into law. 
 
4. The Commission invoked Article 27, para. 1 of the American Convention, which stipulates 
that derogation measures taken by States in time of emergency may “not be inconsistent with 
a State’s other international legal obligations”. 
 
This is a valid argument. The notion “other international legal obligations” is generally 
interpreted as including international humanitarian law [17]. Article 27, para. 1 empowers the 
Commission to evaluate the coherence of a State’s derogation measures in time of armed 
conflict with the norms of humanitarian law by which the State is bound. However, it should 
be borne in mind that the scope of application of Article 27, para. 1 is limited. First, this 
provision applies only if the State concerned has formally declared a state of emergency under 
the American Convention. In practice, States may decide not to derogate from the norms of 
the American Convention even when an armed conflict has occured [18]. Second, the 
Commission can apply international humanitarian law only in so far as it coincides with the 
substantive norms of the American Convention. Thus, provisions that are not covered by the 
American Convention cannot be implemented through this instrument. [19]  
 
5. The Commission referred to an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights as a fifth argument to apply humanitarian law. In its opinion the Court observed: “The 
Commission has properly invoked in some of its reports and resolutions ‘other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American States’, regardless of … whether 
they have been adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the Inter-American 
system.” [20]  
 
This argument seems to provide persuasive evidence that the Court appears to sanction 
application of international humanitarian law by the Commission. However, it should be noted 
that the Court’s decision did not specifically concern humanitarian law. But at some point in 
the future, the Court may be in a position to give an opinion on the Commission’s decision to 
apply international humanitarian law directly. 
 
Should the considerations of the Tablada decision be taken as a precedent? There is no doubt 
that the objective of applying international humanitarian law, that is to improve protection, is 
praiseworthy. However, except possibly for the fifth argument, none of the arguments 
presented by the Commission seems to provide compelling authority for an unqualified 
application of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the aim of 
protection can only be achieved by applying international humanitarian law. Would it not have 
sufficed for the Commission to apply provisions of the American Convention interpreted in the 
light of international humanitarian law? 
 
Be that as it may, the Tablada case is unique [21]. No other human rights treaty body has 
decided that it is competent to apply international humanitarian law directly. Nevertheless, 
international humanitarian law has surfaced in the practice of bodies such as the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights 
[22]. The future will demonstrate whether other human rights treaty bodies decide to follow 
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